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ABSTRACT
Reflection, reflectivity, reflective practice, reflective praxis and 
critical reflection are all dialogical terms used interchangeably to 
mean different things. It is timely to take time out and pause on 
this important concept to consider the wider implications of its use. 
Whatever reflection is, we know there are difficulties in identifying this 
complex idea writers, practitioners and scholars constantly engage 
with reflection in new debates about ‘how to do it better’ assuming 
the ‘it’ is something assessed and understood. More worryingly a 
student’s ability to reflect is assessed assuming the idea of reflective 
practice is a measureable phenomenon. Some have identified 
problems of assessing reflection. There is limited empirical evidence 
of what is reflection. In the substantial literature on reflection we have 
failed to ask the question – ‘What is reflection it if doesn’t exist that 
I might be able to perform it better and others can measure?’ The 
problem of reflection is more complicated when presenting reflective 
performance through language, which will also be explored. This 
article presents a challenge to contemporary ideas of the way in which 
reflection is conceptualised and understood. The article concludes 
with insights and a way forward for a new argument on reflection and 
how it might be linked to virtue ethics rather than it being viewed as 
a skill that can be taught.
Introduction
What is Reflection, reflectivity, reflective practice, reflective praxis and critical reflection 
and who is involved in the debates? These terms are used to mean different things (D’Cruz, 
Gillingham, & Melendez, 2007; Neil, Cropley, Wilson, & Faull, 2013) and moreover, under-
pin new models of practice (Brookfield, 1995, 1997; Dempsey & Murphy, 2001; Fook & 
Gardiner, 2007; Gardiner, 2014; Humphrey, 2009). Some have identified problems of 
assessing reflection (Hobbs, 2007; Wessel & Larin, 2006) and suggest that this may lead 
to unintended destructive consequences (Kam-shing, 2006). In the substantial literature 
on reflection (e.g. Bolton, 2010; Yelloly, & Henkel, 1993; Boud, Keogh, & Walker, 1985; 
Burns & Bulman, 2000; D’Cruz et al., 2007; Gould & Taylor, 1996; Humphrey, 2009; Ixer, 
1999; Mezirow, 1991; Taylor, 2013; Yelloly and Henkel 1993) and others who make claims 
to theory (Redmond, 2004), we have failed to ask the question – ‘What is reflection that 
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2  G. IxeR
I might be able to perform better and in a tangible way others can measure?’ The article 
concludes with a new proposition of conceptualising reflection as an integrated quality 
within our values and the virtue ethics that govern our moral and analytical thinking. In 
this sense reflection is neither a skill nor knowledge but part of the phenomenology of 
moral reasoning and critical thinking?
The concept of reflection is complex and in tackling this problem I have structured the 
article firstly by developing what I see as the problem of reflection when in particular, it is 
assessed. Most of the literature to support my argument comes from education and philoso-
phy rather than psychology and the therapies. I recognise that eastern traditions of reflection 
could reveal alternative explanations such as the concept of ‘mindfulness’ (see Rezek, 2010) 
but this is out of the scope of this article. The deontological position of such a complex 
range of eastern ideas such as spirituality, Judaism, Buddhism, etc. may serve to confuse a 
complicated idea in this short article. Having established the problem with understanding 
reflection practitioners and academics are invited to reconceptualise reflection and in its 
links to virtue ethics. The concept of virtue ethics is an important element to reflection of 
the way we moralise and shape our character in practice, whilst social work values take up 
a deontological position in the realisation to follow duty in compliance with such values, 
whether in conflict or not. By developing a new discourse for reflection will hopefully help 
practitioners, students and educationalists pause to take stock of the empirical evidence 
purporting to define what is understood as reflection and contribute to a new discourse.
The problem
I will review the evidence of reflection and the problematic nature of defining what is 
reflection? Reflection cannot be conceptualised as an idea in isolation with how we think, 
moralise and follow ethical duty. Philosophers have argued for centuries on the nature of 
existence; the metaphysics of being. What I am attempting to do in this article is to extend 
the debate more critically and perhaps make new links to help the reader reconceptualise 
the complex idea of reflection. We have moved away from religious doctrine as a main point 
of reference of knowledge to one where science offers an alternative view, because unless 
such phenomena can be observed and verified they do not exist. The argument of what is 
good science is as prevalent today as it was in the times of Plato, Aristotle and Empedocles. 
However the world today is much more complicated, as matters are not so much determined 
by science from a positivistic epistemology of practice as they are by our relationship with 
the social and cultural world we inhabit and the conflicts of power within relationships 
(Bourdieu, 1990). Social work could more clearly be linked to art than a science, which is 
a comment Schon raised in the way Engineers moved from a profession of ‘creative art’ to 
one of science as part of raising their professional status (1983). The hard evidence of pure 
science was seen as a way to put engineers on the same professional footing as doctors and 
similar professions.
However, knowledge is also bound by issues of power, culture and political imperatives 
that construct social identities for communities to conform and be, controlled (see Bourdieu, 
1991; White's exposition of Foucault, 2007). Therefore, it could be argued that the issue pre-
dominating existence is more about power and oppression in a social and phenomenological 
context than by the science of what exists. It is how we confront our biases and prejudices 
that free us from control (McKay, 2015). Although a complicated idea, I merely highlight 
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SocIal WoRk educaTIon  3
the complexities of a ‘post-postmodern’ world where the idea of reflection uncomfortably 
sits. ‘Postmodernism is sceptical of the truth, unity and progress, opposes what it sees as 
elitism in culture, tends towards cultural relativism and celebrates pluralism, discontinuity 
and heterogeneity’ (Garrett, 2013, p. 22).
Therefore is reflection just a fashionable phenomenon that serves the ruling ideology of 
academics and political thinkers in professional education? Certainly in nursing, some are 
very sceptical and feel reflection is a fundamentally flawed strategy as it lacks little evidence 
of benefits (Macintosh, 1998). A significant start of this debate was in the 1980’s with Schon 
(1983). He saw reflection as an answer to those skills needed to perform professional mastery 
in managing uncertainty and ambiguity against the backdrop of the technical rationality, 
epistemological debate. But was this mere expediency of that time due to critical commen-
tators wanting something more intellectually challenging for professionals? Consequently 
some merely viewed reflection as an ‘out of controlbandwagon’ (Finlay, 2008).
Professionals, educationalists and politicians tend to unquestionably accept the concept 
of reflection. There is not any substantial evidence base or empirical research establishing 
what ‘is reflection’ and how it benefits individual learning (Hargreaves, 2004; Ixer, 1999). 
How then is it possible to develop a major force for change where reflection is a key part 
of reforming regulation? Reflecting on practice is not only an established requirement 
in major professions such as social work, (HCPC, 2012; Johns, 2004; TCSW, 2012) but 
also other industries as well such as architecture, finance, engineering and IT, with which 
are now beginning to view reflection as an important element in continuing professional 
development achievement (UK CPD forum, 2014). Doctors are also beginning to see the 
importance of reflection (Hays & Gay, 2011).
But what is the nature of reflection that is so difficult to define? Reflection can be seen 
as a deeper level thinking process between our ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ voices’ (Eraut, 1994). In 
Plato’s Meno for example, Meno asks Socrates to tell him what virtue is and in his reply 
Socrates says he does not know as it is unclear and probably about being good to your 
family and friends but is certainly something that cannot be taught, although I recognise 
there are strong counter arguments in learning from experience (Boud et al., 1985). If you 
cannot teach virtue then how can you enquire into it if you are wholly ignorant of it. Is it 
ever possible to know this? Do our ethics inform our values therefore and influence the 
way we reflect? Early Greek philosophers viewed the construction of rational thought being 
external of language. This essentially means that we can think about unique problems in 
an original uncontaminated form from our experience and outside of language, which 
in todays’ world is deeply contested because language is a social construction (Bourdieu, 
1991). In contrast the modern Oxford school of philosophers accept we only think through 
language (Strawson cited in Magee, 1998).
Language is a phenomenon that is culturally and socially defined. The use of language 
transmits our social status, identity and to some extent our efficacy and sense of well-being 
(Strawson, 1998). Students learn moral language as a way of demonstrating their under-
standing of values. Consequently, dialogue is an important element especially in how 
we think (Tsang, 2007). When we think a priori and then attempt to communicate such 
thoughts language can limit the true expression and meaning of the transmitted thought. 
Tsang (2007) sees this type of thinking as a form of practical wisdom which Aristotle calls 
Phronesis. Phronesis appears to separate the external and inner voices between practical 
wisdom and moral virtue. Moral thinking informs our reflection because it is the reflection 
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4  G. IxeR
that links the rational and logical thought processes with our empirical knowledge that is 
integrated and controlled by our virtuous sense of duty to make the right decision. When 
we reflect on an issue or a problem at a deeper level of meta-cognition, we judge matters 
as either morally right or not. Therefore, our practice becomes part of our duty to act in 
a way that is in accordance with the principle of doing the right thing for the service user 
(Dracopoulou, 2015) but may clash with principles of utility in doing what is best for the 
majority (the service) and others.
Consequently in social work education a person reflects upon matters in some depth as 
is common in many professions. To illustrate this more clearly students have had to his-
torically present evidence of their reflection on values and anti-discriminatory practice in 
assessed essays through language. Although the student may have successfully reflected on 
their values as a presentation of their learning but because they may be limited by special-
ised and codified language it may not necessarily be recognised by the tutor as reflection. 
Whereas another student may not have reflected at all but presented the required codified 
language of social work values to the tutor and is acknowledged as a successful output of 
reflection. This becomes more acute when the student’s language is not English but required 
to present the product of their reflection in English. This debate presents an ethical issue of 
fairness in assessment. Although it is difficult to separate Reflection from the problematic 
nature of language it is the only means we have to communicate our thinking. Moreover, the 
assessment becomes the means to an end than what I believe is the transformative nature of 
reflection that it might achieve if it were not assessed. Similar to values perhaps reflection 
requires its own codified language for others to recognise when it is achieved.
What is best evidence for the purposes of verification for written academic reflection? 
In this discussion three issues arise. Firstly, reflection is a concept of private and hidden 
thinking in that it is almost impossible to know what has been processed through individual 
reflection as it entirely relies upon the individual representing themselves and presenting 
such material to others even if such material may be influenced by others. Secondly, it only 
becomes known to others when communicated through language. Thirdly, the terminology 
of reflection has become fashionable and ideologically driven without questioning what it 
is and what it achieves. However, it could be argued that it is not a concern what reflection 
is and who uses it as long as the individual pursuing such reflective thoughts feel it helps 
them. This is not problematic in itself only when we require the individual to present evi-
dence of their thinking that we call reflection. The German philosopher Jurgan Habermas 
argues that language becomes a function of communication that is much more complicated 
than we perceive (1987). Manen goes further – ‘Reflection is more difficult to capture in 
language’ (1995, p. 47), yet we still insist on measuring reflection through language in 
assessment, despite others portraying the unproblematic nature of reflection (Dalley 2009). 
More importantly when an individual reflects and shares their reflection it is solely reliant 
on the ability to communicate through language and impossible to deconstruct its elements. 
This is something that Smyth also shares concern about (1992). However, despite this it 
generally appears unproblematic for academics and practitioners to teach reflection and 
assess it despite the contention of what it is and its possible relationship with virtue ethics 
(Osmond and Darlington 2005). In this sense I mean the way an individual shapes their 
ethical character in what they believe is right. The pedagogy of reflection seduces profes-
sionals and students into a false sense of security in its vagueness allowing anyone to make 
unknowable claims of reflective practice achievement.
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SocIal WoRk educaTIon  5
Key arguments
Policy debate
If my proposition is taken on face value then why is reflection, in its many guises so popu-
lar? What does it offer and why do so many struggle to understand the ‘offer’? Professional 
education in social work is political in that all governments in England across the years have 
attempted to determine what professionals should learn and know, in the same way they 
decide what children in schools should know, through regulatory control. Young (1971) 
in his landmark sociological collection of essays ‘Knowledge and Control’, wrote 45 years 
ago that whilst government determines the legitimacy of knowledge and control of what 
people learn the consequence is one of education oppression and a failure in the freedom 
and democratisation of learning. The enforcement of reflection through regulatory con-
trol (CCETSW, 1989 now HCPC, 2012) is analogous to educational autocracy. The UK 
Government’s introduction of ‘Reflecting on your practice’ in social work education came 
within a new Diploma in Social Work (Paper 30, CCETSW, 1989) and was underpinned 
more by a ruling ideology of that time than it was by evidence of its benefits.
The pressure for government to intervene and sort out social work education as a reaction 
to social work disasters such as the death of Victoria Climbe’ (Laming, 2003) is critical, con-
sequently the introduction of reflective learning could be seen as a solution to this problem. 
This is best characterised by the use of reflection in the ‘Social Work Capability Framework’ 
(TCSW, 2012).1 I place no value on this but merely an explanation of how concepts such as 
reflection become centre stage in political policy (see the debate in Garrett, 2013). Therefore 
the policy implementation of that time and since, through numerous reviews (Croisdale-
Appleby, 2014; Munro, 2011; Narey, 2014), have attempted to articulate a new rationale for 
a type of social worker where critical reflection is at the heart. This derives mainly from a 
systemic practice epistemology (Oliver, 2003) where everything is understood as part of 
a whole system. Social workers are more enlightened in their practice by understanding 
the relationship with their part to other parts in the entire system it operates within. It is 
argued here that the ad hoc constant national reviews of what social workers should know 
and do in their role has led to an undermining of the profession and confidence to claim 
their own ground rather than having it given to them. The government’s intention to usurp 
intellectualism and have employers control professional education has seen a driving away 
from the agenda of a distinct knowledge base for social workers owned by the profession to a 
prescription of core knowledge given to them (see Puffett, 2014; who suggests a government 
exam for all children’s social workers and Department of Health, 2015, for a statement of 
what adult social workers should know).
In teaching, nursing and social work we see professions struggling with intellectual and 
professional identities compared with other professions such as doctors. Social work grew up 
through practice development and skills training involved in learning on the job. In social 
work the Certificate in Social Services was a good example (CCETSW, 1976). The new ‘Step 
Up to Social Work’ Programme (HMSO: Department of education, 2014) and ‘Frontline’ 
(Frontline, 2015) are fast track examples of skills-based training, learning the craft of social 
work similar to an apprentice model although at post graduate level. As a response to the 
criticism that students are missing out on intellectual ability because most of their training 
is in practice, the new post graduate routes of ‘Frontline’ and ‘Step Up’ sought to address 
this. To date there is no evidence of whether they were successful. How students develop 
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6  G. IxeR
core intellectual ability to problem-solve, reason and challenge established knowledge in 
action, is a void that Schon (1983) and others claim to fill. More importantly reflection 
could be seen as giving professional status to those professions that lagged behind the more 
science-based established professions of medicine, engineering and even law that view 
knowledge from a positivist paradigm. Reflection is central to this endeavour. Reflection is 
seen as key to raising standards in and status of the profession, a comment Taylor and Bogo 
make in looking at critical reflection as a ‘Wicked Competence’ (2015, p. 1414).
The contested nature of the literature on reflection can be best categorised into three 
epistemological paradigms: Pragmatism, Meta-cognition and Critical Reflection. The fol-
lowing are indicative of key debates from the literature.
Pragmatism
In 1999, Ixer challenged the notion of reflection in an article ‘There is no such Thing 
as Reflection!’ (1999) and reviewed 10 years later to conclude that his original proposi-
tion had not changed (2011). This was because from the 1980s professional education had 
whole-heartedly accepted the concept of reflection as the champion against poor intellec-
tually informed practice in the technical-rational competence model and emphasised a 
new approach to the performance of practice tasks. The work of Schon (1983) saw action 
(practice) being interrupted to enable the individual to think about their experience in 
an experiential mode, analyse the situation and take different action developing a type 
of ‘cognitive map’ to navigate their decision-making. The reflection becomes part of the 
action as it looks at new possibilities. The new-found practice of Donald Schon’s concept 
of reflection in and on action became the sought after nirvana of professional mastery pro-
fessions had been seeking (Schon, 1983, 1987). However, Schon confirms that the artistry 
of thinking in practice is ‘indescribable’ (1983, p. 276) and yet contradicts this by saying it 
can ‘be knowable’ as practitioners describe their intuitive understanding although fails to 
say how this might be possible. This is not surprising as intuition is a complicated process. 
Such contradictions are littered throughout Schon’s work but interestingly he provides a 
core basis for many writers theorising reflection (see Boud et al., 1985; Gould & Taylor, 
1996). If we separate thinking from action then thinking becomes the preparation for action 
and action only as an implementation of thought (Schon, 1983, p. 280). They become a 
complimentary interaction.
Much of Schon’s work is embryonic of earlier pragmatists such as George Mead (Silva, 
2007) in his concept of social constructionism adumbrated by the American educationalist 
Dewey (1933). Dewey saw reflection as a form of doubting when confronted by a problem, 
dilemma or issue to be resolved. More contemporary writers such as Fook and Gardiner 
(2007) base their core theory on this. However, Manen is critical of Dewey’s theory – ‘It’s 
impossible to critically reflect because if you act with doubt in the way Dewey suggests you 
cannot also simultaneously act thoughtfully and critically at the same time?’ (1995, p. 47) 
Reflection in action is an impossible skill. Manen went on to conclude that teachers are 
in the phenomenology of an existential moment when they teach. The ontology of this is 
clearly different to Schon’s theory and is still no nearer to the truth. Therefore, when we ask 
students to use tacit knowledge to tackle problems in the way Schon suggests (1983) the 
outcome of their experience becomes much more difficult to capture in language therefore, 
to be confident it exists. This is not to say that students and practitioners cannot capture 
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SocIal WoRk educaTIon  7
any of their thoughts into language and express to others, but impossible to know which 
thoughts are as a direct result of reflection and those that are more outputs of tacit knowl-
edge and intuition. Especially as the cognitive process is an idea of virtue and how our 
moral character guides our thinking, decision-making and action, therefore our reflection.
In reviewing the most cited work on reflection in Schon (1983), an attractive proposition 
emerges of how individuals can think and act simultaneously to affect their practice as an 
alternative to the dominant paradigm of rationality and the pervading positivist epistemol-
ogy of practice. However, this is fundamentally flawed as evidenced in earlier challenges 
to Schon (Ixer, 1999), subsequently (Ixer, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2011) and presented more 
critically by Eraut (1994). The two main criticisms are that the ‘swampy lowlands’ which 
busy professionals such as social workers inhabit are different to those used as case studies 
by Schon such as Town Planners, Engineers and Managers (see part 2 in Schon, 1983). Also 
and more importantly, there is limited evidence to show what reflecting in action is and 
how one goes about achieving this from the explanation given in his case studies. People 
reflect but their reflection on their reflection in action remains hidden to others to observe 
(Schon, 1983, p. 243) and more importantly able to verify. Articulating one’s analysis of 
meta-thinking about an area of practice would be a complicated skill and even more so for 
another to judge and verify as adequate in any assessment schedule.
Although reflection can be written about as an outcome of reflective thinking, it is 
impossible to independently verify how the student is learning in a way that is more than 
mere replication what they think the tutor wants to see. So how can we be sure that what 
is reflection and what is analytical or reflexive thinking, or are they the same thing? Both 
Schon and other writers on reflection have failed to explain this or consider its links to 
virtue ethics and values.
Meta-cognition
Eraut (1995) takes Schon’s work further by talking about meta-cognition in that individuals 
learn to process different forms of knowledge between internal and external dialogues. What 
makes the reflection in action possible is that individuals learn to do this more quickly, uti-
lising tacit and deliberative knowledge in action. By learning how to do this more quickly 
they are able to process dilemmas in a more effective way and thus, be more responsive when 
required. It is unclear how they do this, but the process presents a new hypothesis, which is 
probably intuitive reasoning, utilising tacit knowledge to aid quick decision-making. This 
in itself is problematic as intuition by its very nature is a process that is outside the control 
of conscious awareness. Eraut’s meta-cognition as an explanation of reflection suggests a 
more hidden process that has limited ‘social’ influence and goes against what Mead (in Silva, 
2007) and others (Brookfield, 1995) have argued yet is inconceivable in that reflection can 
be deconstructed from culture and social influence.
Boud (1998) also contributed to this debate much later in his work on the social process 
of learning. He saw reflection as consistent with elements such as emotions and feelings 
that Ixer defined as domains (2000a) and were linked to the moral duty through values 
and a form of virtue ethics (Ixer, 2003). However, the concept of the relationship between 
meta-cognition and moral action derives much earlier from the Kantian concept of practical 
reasoning (Beck, 1993). It is therefore not a new concept. The social process of thinking 
is something Fook and Gardiner explored as an important facet to reflection (2007) and 
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8  G. IxeR
although in their model agree that the importance of group reflection essentially is an 
individual process. These arguments were presented in the Ixer article in 1999 and 2010 
and are as relevant today as they were then because we have failed to debate the nature of 
what is reflection and rather, unquestionably accept its position as a dominant paradigm 
of meta-cognitive learning.
From reflection to critical reflection
Fook and Gardiner developed reflection and created a theory of reflection based on a 
model that they tested and developed further (Gardiner, 2014). Their main idea was to 
challenge the earlier understanding of reflection and develop an element of ‘criticality’ into 
the reflection process. Reflection occurs whilst remaining in a state of ‘uncertainty’ where an 
individual suspends their quest for answers and certainty to allow a period of uncertainty 
in the construction of new questions. This might be for example, – Why has this happened? 
Why do I feel helpless in this situation? Why am I angry with this family? What should I 
do? How can I manage the situation? Why am I concerned? This process of searching and 
reconstructing questions allows a constant dialogue between what the inner self says to the 
external self and is influenced by culture, social norms and context.
The primary building blocks to Fook and Gardiner’s model are underpinned by four 
theories. Reflective practice – this emphasises feelings, thoughts, values and assumptions 
that influence students and practitioners in their practice. This also emphasises the impor-
tance of experiential and practice knowledge and how we understand this in relation to 
theory in use. Reflexivity – this generates meaning in how we perceive others and how they 
perceive us in given situations. How we perceive ourselves and others is influenced by our 
own values and histories. This is Postmodernism – this challenges the social and political 
status quo that clarifies our social position. Issues of power are important in the way we 
use control through language and other constructs in the way people define themselves. 
Finally, critical social theory identifies the relationship between our social, cultural and 
political structures where we live and our challenge to modernity and how we internalise 
this to make sense of our world. In essence it is ‘bring what we are not aware of into our 
awareness’ or making what is unconscious, conscious (Gardiner, 2014, p. 35). Moreover, 
these ideas are not new as Gramsci explains in knowing yourself enables you to master 
your identity and therefore know others by being critically reflective in your questions. 
This creates a more enlightened social change Gramsci would argue that to know oneself 
ensures you are in control of yourself as part of asserting your identity. He concludes that 
to achieve this one has to know others and their reality. In a sense by learning about others 
you learn about yourself in a reflexive process (Garrett, 2013, p. 114). Brookfield also adds 
to the criticality of developing deep level knowledge by knowing oneself better through his 
four critical lenses (1997) and in particular the autobiographical lens, or self-reflection as 
the foundation of critical reflection. However, despite this there is still little agreement on 
the nature of reflection (Finlay, 2008; McKay, 2015).
Fook and Gardiner’s ideas resonate with Ruch (2000) who describes reflection as a process 
where we pay particular attention to our thoughts and feelings as aroused by a particular 
event. As we process these thoughts which Ruch describes as ‘process reflection’ because it 
brings together the various strands of reflection into a more systemic whole (Ruch, 2000).
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SocIal WoRk educaTIon  9
However tempting it may be to accept these theories uncritically they do no more than 
explain key characteristics that might or might not be reflection. In Fook and Gardiner’s 
model it is clear something works very well for the participants but we are no further under-
standing whether the outcome of using their critical reflective model leads to a new theory 
of reflection or is a natural phenomenon caused by people taking time out to contemplate 
their practice. What is the empirical basis for linking these particular theories to the idea of 
critical reflection and what is its relationship if any with values, ethics and virtue? Although 
Gardiner in particular, explains that the approach ‘gives life meaning’ through a sense of 
spirituality (2014) how is this any different to Rezek’s state of ‘Mindfulness’ (2010)? In 
other work by Kam-Shing suggests that ‘self-reflection’ albeit, mindfulness, spirituality or 
critical reflection, can be dangerous to the practitioner if inappropriate conditions are used 
in the process (2006). This could mean requiring the individual to reflect on their practice 
without any emotional or physical space to do so. Although in all models and theories of 
reflection one can understand the significance it gives in providing depth and meaning to 
the deconstruction of experience but unclear whether this is an explanation of reflection or 
mere experience but either way, takes us no further in our quest for answers because there 
is still little agreement on the nature of reflection (Finlay, 2008; McKay, 2015). However, 
may be there are no answers only further questions.
Empirical evidence
In scanning the vast literature on what is considered as reflection and critical reflection 
very little is empirically based. Through a data base search using general search terms of 
reflection, reflective practice, critical reflection and assessing reflection in professions of 
nursing, social work and education, the following were elicited – Caredata 2817 references, 
ERIC 4259 references, and British Educational Index 106 references. Further more detailed 
search identified nearly 50 articles where abstracts were read identifying empirical research 
on reflection relevant to this article, however only two qualitative studies were found. These 
were George Wilson’s study (2013) and a further study with similar findings from Neil 
et al. (2013). Wilson’s study focussed on student self-reporting through a survey and focus 
groups, which is acknowledged as one of its major limitations. He reports that the survey 
presents 98% of students feeling either confident or very confident in reflecting on their 
practice. While this is promising, there was a degree of ambivalence towards the achievement 
of reflection in the focus groups. It is therefore impossible to give any reliability to self- 
efficacy perceptions in an area as complex as reflection. More important the uncertainty and 
complexities within the concept of what is reflection creates ambiguity amongst students 
when assessed on their reflective performance
students had been confused by the disjunction between the prescriptive, instrumental focus of 
written reflection expected by practice teachers and what they perceived to be more analytical 
and critically reflective focus on theory and literature required for an academic assignment. 
(Wilson, 2013, p. 169)
Wilson places much emphasis on creating the right culture for reflection (2013, p. 168) 
which others have also claimed (Munro, 2011; Yip, 2005) and how it is important to stand 
back and analyse the situation being experienced. This challenges Schon’s (1983) hypothesis 
of practice where it is achieved in the moment of the action. Often organisational culture 
acts as an obstacle to the outcome of reflection, assuming we know what it is and, may lead 
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to Fook and Gardiner (2007) claiming it as a critical challenge and changing practice that 
some managers may not want to see. The economic and business model used by public 
agencies today emphasise productivity and efficiency and managers may be reluctant to 
change their culture to one where the workforce have greater control and say in the values 
of the organisation. Social work is a service industry where key human values might work 
against the business values of financial sustainability. Maintaining the status quo of proce-
dural, ritualistic and functional practice measured by ‘good paperwork’ rather than what 
might be in the best interest of the service user helps maintain power and control over the 
workforce by employers and managers. Singh and Cowden express the consequence of this 
as ‘widespread demoralisation’ – the dominance of neo-liberal managerialism’ (2013, p. 81).
Reflection as an integration of values and virtue ethics
It is clear from the evidence that over the past 30-year reflection and latterly, critical reflec-
tion are important constituents to the advancement of knowledge and have a relationship 
with ethics and values (Cartney, 2015) in particular because values and ethics cannot be 
separated from the thinking process when we reflect. Whether it is developing the deeper 
level knowledge that Entwistle spoke of in the 1980s (2000), Eraut’s postulation of ‘meta-cog-
nition’ (1994), or more recently Fook and colleagues framework for reconceptualising criti-
cal reflection (Fook & Gardiner, 2014), it is clear academics and professionals are interested 
in the phenomenon of reflection. Moreover, its popularity in professional education seems 
to have taken on a life of its own creating a new market of interest that is best characterised 
by grand claims to theory and new enterprises and models of how reflection can be ‘done 
better’ (see Bolton, 2010). I would contend, as argued in this article, that such claims are 
misleading. There is no denying that such explanations of new theories and models are 
helping practitioners think differently about their practice and there is some evidence of 
its benefits, albeit limited in scope (Wilson, 2013). The point I make here is that there has 
neither been systematic evaluation of reflective practice to ascertain its benefits or empirical 
evidence of what is reflection that when observed can be identified and measure unsub-
stantiated claims. Moreover, it will give practitioners confidence in their ability to develop 
their own model of reflection that is helpful to them and be prepared to defend if when 
challenged as opposed to passively accepting a prescribed model.
This article presents an argument that reflection and critical reflection is a hidden process 
of either moral contemplation or meta-cognition and only become necessary to externalise 
and bring to the public arena when needed to communicate for the purposes of measuring 
performance in assessment. Such a process can become exposed when transcending from 
the private world of the individual to the public when an individual reflects in a group for 
example, in Fook and Gardiner’s model. However, this is not to undermine the value in the 
relationship between the student and the practice educator to support learning. Reflecting 
and discussing the outcome of this with your tutor or others is equally important to learning. 
Assessment needs to be clearly defined and understood by the assessor and assessed. If we 
accept this premise then reflection can be neither skill nor knowledge, but rather something 
different. Therefore I am arguing it is a part of our values because of the virtuous nature of 
thinking, driven by moral imperatives to act wisely and do the right thing. In this sense, 
our reflective self becomes part of our virtuous being which bounds us to follow moral 
rules shaped by moral character. As a social worker our moral code is developed by social 
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work values. We learn moral language to express intention to act and perform in a certain 
way as part of this process. However, there may be a conflict between two competing moral 
imperatives. One is the internal belief of being right as part of western culture and social 
history. The second is externally driven to compel us to do right thing as part of the conse-
quential nature of professional codes and values. We are compelled to act in a way as a form 
of compliance. Learning moral language of anti-oppressive practice comes to mind as an 
example of moral compliance whether we internally believe this to be right or not. We act 
to do the right thing rather than act because we believe it to be the right thing.
The integration of deep level thinking with values and ethics helps frame our moral posi-
tion in society and our conduct but whether this is right in a consequentialist approach or 
for the greater good as a form of utility is a debate for a different day. The ethical nature of 
thinking is complex and underpins our reflection but is difficult and almost impossible to 
deconstruct in such a way others can recognise, understand and value. For this reason one 
should be more sceptical in not only how we acknowledge outputs of reflective activity but, 
the unquestioning value we place on its potential to help practitioners think more wisely 
in the absence of evidence.
Critical reflection is a form of thinking difficult to assess. This is because it is a hidden 
process that uses tacit knowledge within a moral framework of intellectualisation (Ixer, 
1997). This process derives from Kairos, the moral action through our internal voice (Tsang, 
2007). Intuitive thinking is challenged by our critical thinking within a moral code of 
taking action that is virtuous. This only presents a rationale of moral thinking as a form 
of ethical compliance to one’s prescribed professional code than to think independently of 
any empirical, social or political influence. To hypothesise in this way helps to reconstruct 
the sense of what critical reflection intends to achieve not as a skill or element of prop-
ositional knowledge, but rather a form of moral thinking. This begs the question that in 
conforming to professional ethics ensures we accept the professional code to behave in a 
certain way. However, unless we accept these codes as part of our own moral code, rather 
than an imported one we will never truly embed it in our practice of values. A complicated 
proposition but one that unless tackled will never be fully understood as a part of what we 
describe as the reflection process.
Consequently, if one accepts this argument, then reflection is an individually developed 
process supported by peers, tutors and supervisors that is difficult to observe and confirm. 
I am arguing that the empirical evidence to support what is reflection is limited therefore 
reflection should be reconceptualised. In doing this may help us be more effective in sup-
porting students. This is not to define the process and outputs of thinking for students and 
measure their performance, but rather help the student’s own deconstruction and personal 
evaluation of the phenomenology of individual reflection. This can and does happen already 
in supervision.
By its very nature reflection is an individual process that does not easily lend itself to 
sharing because of the limitations of translation when communicating complex, hidden 
and unconstructed thought processes communicated to others for recognition and under-
standing. Alternatively should students have greater opportunity to self-assess their own 
ability to reflect? As value reflection is a more complicated process and difficult for others 
to assess. Self-reflection cannot be measured and observed, only judged as an output of 
the individual’s ability to self-evaluate at a more critical level and therefore, demonstrate 
‘cognitive values’ in action. This places the individual in control of their own social order 
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12  G. IxeR
in the way Gramsci viewed everyone as a ‘philosopher’ to ‘know him or herself ’ is to know 
others better (Garrett, 2013, p. 113).
To argue more clearly that reflection should be seen as a value follows the Aristotelian 
tradition of the ‘Virtuous Being’ in doing the right thing (Gottlieb, 2011). There are two 
distinct internal processes taking place side by side, which for me could define a reflective 
process. I have already described one of these in the meta-cognition of reflecting on reflec-
tion whether in, or on practice. It is impossible to separate these concepts of reflection in 
how anyone can ever know whether internal reflection is past, present or future as we do 
not process information in such a logical way. Logic only becomes important when needing 
to communicate our thoughts to others. That is not to say we do not reflect on past present 
and future but difficult to know that when we do it can be accurately identified. This means 
an encounter with the unknown develops a tacit understanding that is opaque and unclear 
to the inquirer. The other process is the moral framework we use to contain and control 
private thinking that drives our action. In Freudian terms we call this the ‘Superego’ (Freud, 
1990), the management function that ensures we follow the rules that are contained within 
boundaries set by what we believe is morally right and a virtuous character.
Although there are limited empirical evidence for this developing theory, if we view 
reflection as a form of virtuous thinking it may help us in the way reflection is taught and 
assessed. Through the struggles students had in developing anti-discriminatory practice 
and the issues of power over the oppressed during the 1980s (Dominelli, 1997), social work 
programmes developed a new sense of confidence to assess values. This can be seen in the 
way the values of social work have since developed (CCETSW, 1976), changed and strength-
ened over time (see GSCC, Codes of Practice, 2002 and more implicit in the HCPC code, 
2012). Values are developed through critical analysis, personal insight and social challenge. 
It is being suggested here that reflection is an ethical process of theorising and exploring 
material that is hidden and often private to others but brought to the forefront of practice 
as characterised in moral action. This enables reflexive inquiry to be open to challenge and 
external scrutiny from others to help re-shape understanding. In the same way a student 
might write about their experience of developing values, a student could be asked to write 
more about their experience of reflecting, in which the output is not the reflection per se 
but an ability to gain new insights as a consequence of their reflection.
Virtue ethics create the moral formwork we use in social work to underpin learning from 
knowledge and skills development. This defines who we are and our own values that shape 
us which often are in conflict with the deontological position taken up by social work values. 
This is because the moral duty to follow social work values is never compromising despite 
when in some situations deviation is required and appropriate. Values are tacitly developed 
and generally assessed in UK social work education from the assessor’s observation of 
these in action despite not always being clear what social work values are. That in itself is 
problematic but as programmes become more sophisticated in triangulating assessment 
findings in practice, the more confident they become in the reliability of assessing values. 
By reconceptualising reflection as a form of ethical thinking allows students to challenge the 
consequences of their reflection. The student evaluates their reflective learning, articulates 
this to the assessor and demonstrates their action in practice that can also be observed at 
a future time. This makes for fairer assessment because it is transparent and the outputs 
are more measurable. The student is in control of the material they are reflecting upon and 
can export their hidden thoughts to the public world for others to access and understand. 
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SocIal WoRk educaTIon  13
It relies on integrity and honesty of the learner in their relationship with the practice edu-
cator and with this dynamic the process of reflection can be become clearer and possible 
for others to recognise. This theory of reflection and its link to virtue ethics needs testing 
to explore more empirically the relationship between the meta-cognitive processes of our 
thinking with the ethical ability to think virtuously.
Conclusion
Reflection is clearly something individuals use and find helpful in the limited research 
available, which is the rationale behind deconstructing reflection as a form of values and 
ethics. Educationalists, practitioners, mentors and supervisors should reduce their quest to 
define the outputs of an individual’s reflection through essays and reflective logs and focus 
on a student’s own ability to self-evaluate their personal sense of reflection as part of an 
assessment of ethical critical thinking. Gibb (2010) writes that adult learning should be an 
expression of freedom given to individuals by allowing the learner to explore, create and 
deliver their own ideas and thoughts rather than those given to them by the pedagogue. This 
then becomes a more transformative and emancipatory approach to individual learning 
and reflection.
The idea to relate virtue ethics to reflection is something that needs further exploration 
but there is sufficient evidence in my argument to be confident of its importance when we 
contemplate matters that demand a more critical and moral analysis when contemplating 
dilemmas as social workers do daily. Although we are uncertain what is reflection therefore, 
to replicate and improve our reflection may be no more than a misleading quest that can 
never be adequately realised. Alternatively it may not matter as long as what we require from 
students and professionals is clear, transparent and measurable then whatever reflection is 
or is not, becomes irrelevant.
Note
1.  Since writing this article The College of Social Work has closed and the Capabilities Framework 
has been transferred to the British Association of Social Workers.
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